The paper examines how the innovator's ability to enforce her patent rights affects (and is affected by) her decision to patent her innovation and her patent breadth decision. Specifically, the paper shows that the innovator might find it optimal to patent her innovation even if the patent would not be defended if it were violated. Nevertheless, the patent is valuable because it can be used to influence the entrant's location decision in a way that is profitable for the incumbent. In addition to showing that a patent need not be actually enforced when infringed to be valuable, the paper shows that the greater is the entrant's R&D effectiveness, the smaller is the innovator's incentive to patent her product. If patenting occurs, however, the greater is R&D effectiveness, the greater is the patent breadth that could be chosen without triggering infringement.
Introduction
The decision to patent an innovation suggests that the innovator could then strategically use the resulting intellectual property right to affect market entry and the location decisions of potential entrants, thereby increasing profits.
1 For example, Gallini (1984) shows that an incumbent monopoly may license a technology to an entrant, since allowing her into the market reduces her incentive to undertake R&D that could make her an even stronger competitor. In a similar vein, Rockett (1990) argues that licensing can be used as a way of selecting weak competitors; their presence then keeps stronger competitors out of the market when the patent expires. Yiannaka and Fulton (2006) show that an incumbent can use her patent breadth to alter the product location of an entrant in a way that increases her profits.
In the above cases, the strategic value of the patent is its ability to influence the entrant's entry and location behavior, since the patent, which is costly to obtain, will have no value if no change in behavior is induced. The ability to strategically use the patent to influence behavior depends critically on its enforceability; if it cannot be enforced when infringed, then no change in behavior can be achieved. 2 However, as we posit in this paper, a patent need not be actually enforced when infringed to be valuable; instead, a patent can be valuable if it is potentially enforceable.
The purpose of our paper is twofold. First, the paper examines how the innovator's ability to enforce her patent rights affects and is affected by her decision to patent her innovation and her patent breadth decision. Second, the paper shows that a patent that is not actually enforced can still be valuable for the patentee by inducing the desired behavior by the entrant. To address these issues, the paper develops a game theoretic model that examines the optimal patenting behavior of an incumbent innovator who has generated a patentable product innovation and who is faced with potential entry by an entrant supplying a superior quality product. The incumbent/innovator has to decide whether she should patent her innovation and, if so, what patent breadth should be claimed.
If her patent is infringed, the incumbent also has to decide whether she should invoke a trial to defend the patent. An important feature of the model is that the entrant may be able, by his choice of location in product space, to affect the incumbent's decision to defend her patent.
Using a general model, the paper gives the conditions under which the patent has no impact on the entrant's behavior and thus patenting is not desirable. These conditions are associated with relatively small R&D costs for the potential entrant and large trial costs and small monopoly profits for the innovator. When the above conditions do not obtain, a patent, combined with the optimal patent breadth, can affect the entrant's entry and location decisions and patenting may be optimal for the innovator. When patenting is optimal, the smaller are the entrant's R&D costs, the greater is the patent breadth that could be chosen without triggering infringement. This result occurs because the greater is the entrant's R&D effectiveness, the further away from the incumbent the entrant can locate in the product space; the outcome is increased product differentiation, less competition and thus higher profits for both players. Moreover, there are certain conditions when the innovator can use the breadth of her patent to deter market entry -specifically when the entrant's R&D and trial costs are large, the innovator's trial costs are small and her monopoly profits are large and the effect of patent breadth on patent validity is small.
A key finding of the paper is that the innovator might find it optimal to patent her innovation even if the patent would not be defended if it were to be violated. This result (which is more likely to occur when the entrant's R&D effectiveness is relatively high) occurs because, by choosing to patent her innovation, the incumbent can induce the entrant to choose a location in product space that, even though it infringes the patent and is not enforced, is still more advantageous for the incumbent than the other possible outcomes. Under this case, the entrant, knowing that his location decision affects the incumbent's decision to invoke a trial, strategically chooses a location that will not be challenged by the incumbent. The possibility that an incumbent might patent an innovation, even though she would not legally enforce it, depends critically on the fact that the patent is potentially enforceable; it is this potential enforceability that allows the incumbent to affect the entrant's location decision who is induced to choose a location that will not be challenged. Without this enforceability, the entrant would simply locate at his most preferred location (where he would have located under no patent protection) and not the one desired by the incumbent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical development of the patenting decisions model (i.e., the decision to patent, the patent breadth decision and the decision to invoke a trial under infringement), section 3 provides the analytical solution of the patenting game and section 4 concludes the paper. An application of the general model is provided in the Appendix.
The patenting decisions model

2.1
Model assumptions
Our model builds upon the model developed by Yiannaka and Fulton (2006) who study the optimal patent breadth decision when under infringement a trial always takes place. In addition to examining the innovator's optimal patent breadth decision, our model considers the innovator's decision to patent and her decision to invoke a trial when her patent is infringed. The patenting decisions are modeled in a sequential game of complete and perfect information between two agents; an incumbent innovator who has invented a patentable drastic product innovation and a potential entrant. At the beginning of the game the incumbent's product has already been generated. 3 The incumbent decides whether to seek patent protection, how broad of a protection to claim and whether to defend her patent when infringement occurs; the entrant decides whether to enter the incumbent's market and, if entry occurs, where to locate in a vertically differentiated product space. To keep the focus on the innovator's patenting and patent breadth decisions we assume that the regulator (e.g., Patent Office) always grants the patent as claimed; thus, the regulator is not explicitly modeled. 3 Even thought the innovator's R&D investment decision that led to the generation of the innovation is important, to keep the analysis tractable, this decision is not considered here. 4 As in Yiannaka and Fulton (2006) , who point to failures in the patent granting process and suggest that the innovator cannot always rely on the Patent Office for help in refining her patent claims, we examine the innovator's patenting behavior when she has no feedback from the Patent Office. above imply that it is increasingly costly for the entrant to locate away from the incumbent in the one-dimensional product space (i.e., to produce the better quality product) and the filing of a patent by the incumbent provides the entrant with knowledge of how to produce the incumbent's product (i.e., the assumption of perfect information disclosure by the patent is made). An important assumption of the model is that, in the absence of patent protection, reverse engineering of the product innovation is possible and costless. Once the R&D costs are incurred, production of the products by both the incumbent and the entrant occur at zero marginal cost and neither the incumbent nor the entrant find it optimal to relocate once they have chosen their respective qualities (i.e., relocation is prohibitively costly).
5 Setting the quality of the incumbent's product p q equal to zero simplifies the notation without affecting the qualitative nature of the model. As a result, the entrant's quality e q is interpreted as the difference in quality between his product and that of the incumbent, or more generally as the distance the entrant has located away from the incumbent.
The patent breadth is denoted by b where ] 1 , 0 ( ∈ b determines the area in the onedimensional product space that the patent protects. Patent breadth thus determines the minimum size of e q needed to ensure that the entrant's product does not infringe on the incumbent's patent. A fencepost patent system is assumed where patent claims define an exact border of protection and where infringement will always be found when an entrant locates within the incumbent's claims, unless the entrant proves that the patent is invalid (Cornish 1989). 6 The probability that the patent will be found to be valid, or equivalently that infringement will be found, is given by ( b, ) μ α where
The parameter α is a validity parameter that reflects the degree that patent breadth affects patent validity; for any given patent breadth, the greater is the validity parameter, the smaller is the probability that the patent will be found valid. The inverse relationship between the probability that the patent will be found valid and patent breadth is based on evidence from the literature that shows that, the broader is the patent protection, the harder it is to establish validity since the harder it is to show novelty, nonobviousness and enablement (Cornish 1989, Miller and Davis 1990) . In addition, courts tend to uphold narrow patents and invalidate broad ones (Waterson 1990 , Cornish 1989 , Merges and Nelson 1990 When the entrant locates at a distance e q b ≤ away from p q the patent is infringed and the incumbent must decide whether to invoke an infringement trial or not. It is assumed that the filing of an infringement lawsuit by the incumbent is always met with a counterclaim by the accused 6 The implication of assuming a fencepost patent system is that the probability that infringement is found (given that the entrant has located at e q b ≤ distance away from p q ) does not depend on how close the entrant has located to the incumbent and it is equal to the probability that the validity of the patent will be upheld. Thus, the fencepost patent system implies that the events that the patent is found to be infringed and that the patent is found to be invalid can be treated as mutually exclusive and exhaustive. 7 Note that, since further entry is not anticipated in our model our analysis and results are not affected by whether the entire patent is invalidated during the infringement/validity trial or only certain claims are found to be invalid (i.e., the patent breadth is narrowed).
infringer that the patent is invalid -a common defense of accused infringers (Cornish 1989, Merges and Nelson 1990) . Note that given our assumption of perfect information, the incumbent costlessly identifies infringement as soon as it occurs. This further implies that the incumbent suffers no losses in profits due to infringement and thus the case where the courts award infringement damages to the incumbent is not considered. The legal costs incurred during the infringement trial/validity attack by the incumbent and the entrant are denoted by does so by choosing the quality e q of his product relative to that of the incumbent. This decision 8 By assuming that legal costs are sunk we exclude the possibility of the courts awarding legal fees to either party. In some cases, if infringement is found to be wilful, the court may require that the infringer pays damages up to three times greater than the actual losses due to infringement, opponent's legal costs and court costs (Lerner 1995, Crampes and Langinier 2002) . To keep the analysis simple, the possibility of wilful infringement is not examined. Note that, given our assumption of perfect information, the entrant knows in our model whether he has infringed the patent or not (i.e., whether he has located within the incumbent's claims), and thus, the assumption that infringement is not wilful implies that when the entrant infringes the patent he believes that the patent is invalid and thus not infringed.
determines whether the entrant infringes the patent or not, as well as whether the incumbent will invoke a trial in the case the patent is infringed. 
Stage 5 -The pricing stage
In the fifth stage of the game, when the entrant enters the market, the two players choose their respective prices to maximize their profits. The entrant has the higher quality product and is able to charge the higher price. Profits for both the incumbent and the entrant are increasing in the quality chosen by the entrant, e q , since the greater is the difference in quality between the two products, the less intense is competition at the final stage of the game. 
Stage 4 -The incumbent's trial decision
As illustrated in Figure 1 , under patenting the entrant's quality choice, e q , will determine whether the patent will be infringed and whether in the case of infringement a trial will take place. When the entrant infringes the patent, the incumbent needs to decide whether to invoke an infringement trial or not. Given the quality chosen by the entrant, the incumbent will invoke a trial when the patent is infringed as long as her expected profits when a trial takes place, ( )
, are greater than her profits when a trial does not take place, ( )
When the incumbent invokes a trial her expected profits are given by:
Equation (1) demonstrates that at trial infringement will be found (or equivalently the validity of the patent will be upheld) with probability ( , ) b μ α , the entrant will not be allowed in the market and the incumbent will have a monopoly position. Conversely, with probability ( , ) 1 b μ α − , infringement will not be found, the entrant will be allowed to market his product and the incumbent and the entrant will operate as duopolists.
When the incumbent does not invoke a trial her profits are given by:
Equation (2) shows that when the incumbent does not invoke a trial when infringement occurs she shares the market with the entrant and realizes duopoly profits which depend on the entrant's choice of location in the quality product space.
Given the above the incumbent will invoke a trial when her patent is infringed if:
Equation (3) shows that the incumbent's decision on whether to invoke a trial when her patent is infringed is affected by the entrant's location decision. We denote the quality that makes the incumbent indifferent between invoking and not invoking a trial by ( , )
, and assume that when the incumbent is indifferent she will choose to not invoke a trial. Since infringement occurs when e q b ≤ , e q is defined for patent breadth values such that e q b ≤ and is decreasing in patent breadth at an increasing rate, i.e., 
Appendix A 1 for a proof). Thus, the greater is the patent breadth chosen, the smaller is the quality chosen by the entrant that will infringe the patent without invoking a trial. the monopoly profits that can be earned by the incumbent increase, the locus e q shifts upward and the more likely it becomes that a trial will take place under infringement (the infringement and trial area becomes larger). As the incumbent's trial costs and the effect of patent breadth on patent validity increase, the locus e q shifts downward and the less likely it is that the incumbent will find it optimal to invoke a trial under infringement (the infringement and trial area becomes smaller).
Stage 3 -The entrant's location decision
As illustrated in Figure 1 , two cases must be considered regarding the entrant's location decision depending on whether the incumbent has patented her innovation or not. The latter case is considered first.
No patent protection
Given our assumption of possible and costless reverse engineering, the entrant cannot be deterred from entering the market under no patent protection; at the very least, the entrant can locate at The relationship between the entrant's most preferred location, * e q , and patent breadth b determines the incumbent's optimal patenting strategy as discussed in the following proposition and corollary. q the patent is infringed but the incumbent will not invoke a trial (see Figure A 2 . 1 in Appendix A 2 ). Knowing that she won't be able to enforce/defend her patent rights, the incumbent will not seek patent protection.
Thus, for positive patenting costs, when * e q b > a patent will not be sought by the incumbent.
Corollary 1. The greater the entrant's R&D effectiveness, the greater the effect of patent breadth on patent validity, α , and the greater the incumbent's trial costs, T p C , and the smaller the monopoly profits, m
Π , the more likely it is that the incumbent will not find it optimal to seek patent protection.
The results in corollary 1 could be seen in see Figure q b > will hold. Also, the greater is the entrant's R&D effectiveness (i.e., the smaller are the entrant's R&D costs), the further away from the incumbent the entrant finds it optimal to locate (the greater is * e q ) and the more likely it is that the inequality * e q b > will hold.
Patent protection (
Given the result in proposition 1, a necessary condition for patent protection to be an optimal strategy for the incumbent is that When the entrant decides to enter and infringe the patent he must determine whether to induce the incumbent to invoke a trial or not. The entrant's optimal strategy depends on which of the above two options generates greater profits. The entrant's profits under infringement and trial are determined below followed by an examination of the entrant's profits under infringement and no trial.
The Entrant's Profits under Infringement and Trial
Recall that during an infringement trial there is a probability ( , ) b μ α that infringement will be found (i.e., the validity of the patent will be upheld) and a probability ( , ) 1 b μ α − that infringement will not be found (i.e., the patent will be revoked). If infringement is found during trial, the entrant is not allowed to market his product and the patentee earns monopoly profits. If infringement is not found during trial, the entrant is allowed to market his product and the patentee and the entrant operate as duopolists. The optimal quality chosen by the entrant under infringement and trial is determined by solving:
The F.O.C. for the choice of the optimal quality under infringement and trial ( )
q is given by: 
The first part of result 2 follows from a comparison of equations (5) and (9) and the intuition behind it is that under infringement and trial there is uncertainty as to whether the entrant will be able to continue in the market and the entrant 'underlocates' to reduce the R&D costs, which are incurred with certainty. The intuition behind the second part of result 2 is that an increase in patent breadth increases the likelihood of the patent being invalidated during an infringement trial (in which case the entrant is allowed to continue in the market) and results in the entrant being willing to invest more in quality (for a proof of the second part of result 2 see Appendix A 3 ).
Result 3. The entrant's profits under infringement and trial are increasing in patent breadth, b , at
an increasing rate, i.e., ( )
The intuition behind result 3 is that the greater is patent breadth , b , the greater is the probability that infringement will not be found at trial (i.e., that the patent will be found invalid and will be revoked) and the entrant will be allowed in the market (for a formal proof of result 3 see Appendix A 4 ).
The Entrant's Profits under Infringement and No Trial
This case considers the situation where the choice of the entrant's most preferred quality 
The intuition behind result 4 is as follows. Since 
The entry/infringement decision
Given that the entrant's quality choice depends on the incumbent's patent breadth decision, before we are able to determine the entrant's optimal strategy we must first examine whether there exist some critical patent breadth values that when chosen by the incumbent make the entrant indifferent between the alternative strategies that are available to him. We assume that when the entrant is indifferent between no infringement and infringement and trial he chooses to not infringe the patent while when he is indifferent between infringement and trial and infringement and no trial he choose to infringe and not induce a trial.
Scenario A: Entry deterrence
The entrant will not find it profitable to enter the market if there exists a patent breadth value 
Proposition 2. A patent breadth,b , that deters entry always exists when ( ) ( )
Scenario B: Entry cannot be deterred
When the entry deterrence conditions in proposition 2 do not obtain, entry cannot be deterred and the optimal strategy for the entrant depends on the relationship between the entrant's profits under ; the strategy of infringing the patent and not inducing the incumbent to invoke a trial is never an optimal strategy. This case is more likely to emerge when the incumbent's trial costs, such that entry can be deterred, then the incumbent will always choose this patent breadth and deter entry. By deterring entry, the incumbent earns monopoly profits, m Π which are higher than what can be earned under a duopoly.
Scenario B: Entry cannot be deterred (Cases I A , I B , II A and II B )
The relevant patent breadth values for the incumbent when she wishes to patent the innovation and entry cannot be deterred are such that ( , ) The incumbent will choose infringement and no trial over infringement and trial when Figure 3) . Thus, when deciding between infringement and no trial and infringement and trial, the incumbent's optimal strategy is to always choose infringement and no trial.
Proposition 3. When entry cannot be deterred and it is either (a) never optimal for the entrant to infringe the patent and face a trial (case I A ) or (b) infringement and trial is optimal for the entrant only for relatively large patent breadth values (case I B ), an optimal strategy for the incumbent is to claim the patent breadth b that induces the entrant to infringe the patent and not face a trial.
Proof: Given the results in lemma 1, the incumbent's decision under cases I A and I B is reduced to deciding whether to induce no infringement or infringement and no trial. Since the incumbent's profits are increasing in the entrant's quality choice e q , both under no infringement and under infringement and no trial i.e., Since any patent breadth that is greater than b (e.g., b ), will lead to the entrant locating closer to the incumbent (note that e q b = at b while ( , ] 
Proposition 3 establishes the main result of the paper, namely that an innovator could find it optimal to patent her innovation even if the patent would not be defended if it were violated. It should be stressed that, even though the incumbent does not find it optimal to defend her patent by claiming the patent breadth b , the patent is nevertheless valuable. Indeed, without the patent, the entrant would not locate at b , but rather at * e q b < . The presence of the patent means that the option for the incumbent to take the entrant to court to defend the patent exists. It is the entrant's desire to avoid this option (since doing so increases his profits) that results in him locating further from the incumbent than would be the case in the absence of patent protection. Thus, undefended patents need not signal exploitation or "robbery" by the entrant, but rather represent the outcome of a game in which lack of patent defense emerges as an optimal strategy.
Corollary 3. When entry cannot be deterred and it is either (a) never optimal for the entrant to infringe the patent and face a trial (case I A ) or (b) infringement and trial is optimal for the entrant only for relatively large patent breadth values (case I B ), the incumbent maximizes her profits by claiming a relatively narrow rather than broad patent protection as a narrow patent breadth leads to greater product differentiation.
This result shares a similarity with a result in Yiannaka and Fulton (2006) . In their model, where litigation is not endogenous and a trial always occurs upon infringement, if the incumbent finds it optimal to induce non-infringement she chooses a patent breadth that induces the entrant to locate at the edge of patent breadth. In our model the infringement and no trial outcome implies the choice of a patent breadth that similarly induces the entrant to locate by the edge of patent breadth.
The incumbent's profits under case I A are depicted in Figure 6 , panel (i) while her profits under case I B are depicted in Figure 6 , panel (ii).
Case II A Under this case, the incumbent has to decide whether to choose a patent breadth ( , ] 
Lemma 2. Under case II A , the incumbent's profits under no infringement are greater than her profits under infringement and no trial; i.e., the infringement and no trial strategy is always dominated by the no infringement strategy.
If the incumbent were to choose to induce non infringement the optimal strategy would be to choose the patent breadth b since this is the patent breadth that forces the entrant to locate the furthest away possible in the quality space without infringing the patent. If the incumbent were to choose to induce infringement and no trial then the optimal strategy would be to choose patent breadth b since this is the patent breadth that induces the entrant to locate the furthest away possible under infringement and no trial (for any b b > the entrant locates closer to the incumbent). Since the incumbent's profits under no infringement and under infringement and no trial are both increasing in the quality chosen by the entrant, e q , the incumbent is better off choosing b rather than b , i.e., ( ) ( ) ( )
Proposition 4. When entry cannot be deterred and the entrant finds it optimal to infringe the patent and face a trial for intermediate patent breadth values and infringe the patent and not face a trial
for relatively large patent breadth values (i.e., case II A ), the optimal strategy for the incumbent is to choose a patent breadth value that induces the entrant to not infringe the patent, i.e.,
Proof: The result in proposition 4 follows directly from lemma 1 and 2.
Case II A when the optimal patent breadth under infringement and trial is given by Figure 6 , panel (iii).
Case II B
Under this case, it is never optimal for the entrant to infringe the patent without inducing a trial. The incumbent has to decide whether to choose a patent breadth ( , ] 
Stage 1 -The patenting decision
In stage 1 of the game the incumbent decides whether to patent her innovation or not given her knowledge of the entrant's response to her patent breadth and trial decisions. The incumbent will choose to patent her innovation when the profits earned under patenting are greater than the profits earned under no patent protection, . . As shown in proposition 1, the incumbent will always find it optimal not to patent the innovation when * e q b ≥ regardless of the level of patenting costs. In this case, had the incumbent chosen to patent, the entrant would always choose * e q and the incumbent would not find it optimal to invoke a trial. Thus, if under patenting the incumbent can never enforce her patent rights when the patent is infringed she always chooses not to patent.
The incumbent may find it optimal to patent her innovation when the entrant's location choice affects her decision to invoke a trial under infringement (i.e., when * e q b < ). In this case, whether the incumbent will find it optimal to patent or not depends on the magnitude of the parameters of the model (the level of monopoly profits, trial and R&D costs and the incumbent's patenting costs).
An application of the general model where the use of specific functional forms that satisfy the general model assumptions facilitates the exposition of the main results is presented in the Appendix.
Concluding remarks
A game theoretic model was developed to examine how the innovator's ability to enforce her patent rights affects and is affected by her decision to patent her innovation and her patent breadth decision, and to show that unenforced patents can still be valuable for patent holders. The innovator in our model seeks patent protection for a product innovation under potential entry by a firm producing a better quality product.
Patenting is only optimal if the existence of the patent causes the entrant to locate further away from the incumbent in product space than would be the case in the absence of a patent. The incumbent is unable to use a patent to influence the entrant's location choice when her trial costs are large, when the monopoly profits that can be captured are relatively small and when the entrant's R&D costs are relatively low. Under these conditions, the patenting strategy is always dominated by the no patenting strategy for positive patenting costs.
When these conditions do not obtain, the incumbent is able to use patent breadth to induce the entrant to locate further away in the quality product space than he would have located under no patent protection. When such relocation is possible, patenting may become an optimal strategy, with the patenting choice dependent on the relative magnitude of the patenting costs vis-à-vis the extra profits that are obtained as a result of inducing the entrant to alter his location choice.
An important result of the paper is that a patent can be effective at altering the entrant's location choice (and thus the rents that can be captured by the patent) even if the incumbent innovator does not defend the patent when it is violated. This result occurs because the incumbent's decision to defend a patent by invoking a trial is one that the entrant can influence by his choice of location. Under a specific set of conditions -most notably when the entrant's R&D costs are relatively low and his trial costs are relatively high -the incumbent selects a patent breadth that results in the entrant choosing a location that, even though it infringes the patent and the incumbent does not find it optimal to defend the patent by invoking a trial, it is still advantageous for the incumbent. Thus, situations where the patentee does not actively defend violated patents may in fact be optimal -the entrant is not getting away with robbery, but instead has been induced to select this location by the incumbent. Such a strategy is optimal because a relatively narrow rather than broad patent breadth achieves greater product differentiation and thus greater profits for the incumbent.
The above results hold under our model assumptions of complete and perfect information, single entry, a deterministic R&D process and possible and costless reverse engineering of the innovator's product. Relaxing the above assumptions is the focus of future research. (8) and it is thus negative. ( ) Since each consumer consumes one unit of the product of her choice, the demand for the products produced by the incumbent and the entrant are given by As outlined in section 3.1, the entrant has the higher quality product and is able to charge the higher price.
Profits for both the incumbent and the entrant are increasing in the quality chosen by the entrant, e q ; thus, maximum product differentiation is desirable to both players. Π , for which patent protection will and will not be sought. ≤ , the incumbent might find it optimal to seek patent protection and the entrant's location decision will determine whether the incumbent will find it optimal to invoke a trial in the case of infringement. Note that 
